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Life Insurance-A Frozen Asset
By CHARLES C. NICOLA

of the Denver Bar
Only a few can afford to die. In the past decade death has been transformed from its historic role as the advent of the better life into a taxable
event of overwhelming magnitude and dismal consequences. Acceptance of
the proposition that one must pay as he goes--and pay handsomely-has
precipitated a shift in emphasis among problems of estate planning. The
protection of the estate from the impact of federal taxation has emerged as
a factor of principal concern to prospective decedents and their advisers.
The problem customarily involves two considerations-the minimization
of taxes and the provision of funds for their payment. The irrevocable
living trust is the most favored device for accomplishing this dual objective.
By depleting the gross taxable estate through inter vivos gifts, this plan
travels the only broad avenue which remains open for minimization of
estate tax; and if the trust is properly constructed, the availability of the
corpus thereof for payment of the settlor's death taxes may be retained
without subjecting such funds to inclusion in the settlor's gross estate. The
trust offers the additional feature of excluding the corpus thereof from the
income beneficiary's taxable estate, thus eliminating a "second" estate tax
on the same property.
But great care must be given to the terms of the trust and to the type
of property to be placed in trust if maximum tax benefits are to be derived.
If the corpus of the trust is to be excluded from the settlor's gross estate,
close attention must be paid to the following fundamentals:
1. The trust must be irrevocable. If the settlor reserves the right to
alter, amend, revoke, or terminate the trust, its corpus will be swept
into his gross estate by operation of Section 811(d) of the Internal
Revenue Code.
2. The transfer in trust must not be made in contemplation of death,
or the corpus thereof will be includible in the settlor's gross estate
under Section 811 (c).
3. The transfer in trust must not be intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after the settlor's death, or the corpus thereof
will be includible under another provision of Section 811 (c). Under
the rule of the Hallock case 1 the transfer in trust will be regarded
as one intended to take effect at the settlor's death if he reserves a
possibility of reverter in the corpus.
4. The settlor must not reserve certain rights over and benefits from
trust property, as particularly set out in Section 811(c). Broadly
Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106.
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speaking, this includes a reservation for the settlor's life of the right
to receive the income from the trust or the right to designate the
persons who are to receive the income.
The foregoing are the prerequisites of a valid irrevocable gift in trust.
Each must be satisfied if the corpus of the trust is to be removed sufficiently
from the dominion and control of the settlor so that it will not be regarded
as his at his death and thus includible in his taxable estate. To intend that
the transfer possess these qualities is, of course, not enough. The successful
creation of such a trust depends upon the draftsman's familiarity with the
law of federal taxation and with the frequently changing meanings ascribed
to these terms which are subject to constant redefinition by regulations and
court and board decisions.
It has been asserted that notwithstanding the fact that the settlor has
parted absolutely and forever with the property comprising the trust, he
may set up the trust in such a manner that the assets thereof may be used by
the executor of his estate to pay death taxes. It has also been represented
that this can be accomplished without subjecting the assets of the trust to
inclusion in the settlor's taxable estate. This result is achieved customarily
by including among the broad powers of management and investment given
to the trustee, the power to lend funds to or purchase property from the
executor of the estate of the settlor upon such terms as the trustee, in his
sole discretion, shall deem appropriate. The trustee is thus in a position to
rescue from the estate of the settlor at a fair price, assets of the estate which
otherwise might have to be sold in the open market at substantial loss for
the purpose of raising funds in a short time for the payment of death taxes.
Without this provision, the settlor is obliged to retain in his personal estate
relatively unproductive liquid assets of sufficient value to pay the taxes which
accrue at his death. With this provision he may dispose of them safely during his lifetime, seizing the tax advantages which attend the depletion of his
estate, but retaining the use of those funds for. the same purpose to which
they would have been put had he kept them in his taxable estate.
This is the broad general outline of the terms of a trust designed to
accomplish minimization of estate taxes consistent with the maintenance of
funds for their payment. It should be noted parenthetically, but without
discussion of the many ramifications of the problem, that substantial reductions in surtaxable net income are available to the settlor through use of such
a living trust, if the settlor limits his reservation of administrative control
and power of disposition to the bounds prescribed by Sections 29.22(a)21 and 22, Regulations 111, and the income beneficiary is not one whom the
settlor is legally obligated to support.2 Such a beneficiary cannot be a financially emancipated child of the settlor. The income of the trust thus may be
Section 167 I. R. C. includes in the taxable income of the settlor of a trust that
part of the income of the trust which is applied or distributed for the support or maintenance of a beneficiary whom the settlor is legally obligated to support or maintain.
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the broad and almost all
kept within the same family group notwithstanding
3
inclusive prohibition of the Clifford doctrine.
If the transfer in trust constitutes a valid gift, it will save estate taxes
and income taxes, but may subject the settlor to a gift tax. However, that is
not a substantial objection to the plan. Against his potential gift tax liability,
the settlor may claim a specific exemption of $30,000.00, which exemption
is forever lost to him if he does not take it. 4 The value of the gift in excess
of $30,000.00 is taxed at a rate which is approximately 25 % less than the
estate tax rate. The difference in tax is actually much greater than the percentage differential suggests, because the gift removes the corpus thereof from
taxation in the highest estate tax bracket and subjects it to a tax in the lowest
gift tax bracket.
So much for the terms of the trust and the tax-wise results which can
be anticipated therefrom. If maximum benefits to the settlor are to be obtained,
particular attention must be paid to the type of property to be placed in
trust. If the property is such that can be expected to increase in value subsequent to the taxable transfer, the gift tax will be at a lower rate, in a lower
bracket, and on a lower valuation. It should be property which will continue
to produce after it has been transferred, unlike assets of the settlor's the
earning capacity of which may depend upon the exercise of his individual
skill and management, such as the settlor's business. Inasmuch as the income
from the trust is not to be reserved it should be property upon which the
settlor is not dependent for his support. It should be property which is
reasonably liquid, for it must be capable of being reduced to cash in the open
market with a minimum of loss, if it is to be used for the payment of taxes
as discussed above.
Life insurance is an asset possessing all of these qualities to a marked
degree and it has been sold to many people largely on the strength of its
adaptability to the payment of death taxes. Insured persons have seized upon
the opportunity to exclude life insurance proceeds from their taxable estates
through creation of funded life insurance trusts. The transfer of policies by
the insured to a trustee coupled with release of all incidents of ownership "
pertaining to the policies and the payment of premiums by someone other
than the insured subsequent to the transfer, became a well accepted plan
of estate tax avoidance. The funded life insurance trust is a sound proposition, not only from the points of view of the settlor and his benefiiciaries,
but from the standpoint of the public revenue. Wherever used, it provides
3

Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331.
'The $3,000.00 annual exclusion of gifts to each donee is not applicable to gifts
in trust except to the extent of the interest of the income beneficiary. As to remaindermen, the gift is regarded to be one of a future interest to which the annual exclusion
does not apply.
' Incidents of ownership include the right to change the beneficiary, to borrow
against the policy, to pledge it as security, to assign, surrender or convert it.
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a reserve of cash which is available immediately at death for the payment
of taxes. It would seem to have been the purpose of proper legislation to
have encouraged the use of life insurance in gifts, and it is surprising, therefore, that plans involving the transfer inter vivos of life insurance policies
were dealt a fatal blow by the 1942 amendment to Section 811(g) of the
Internal Revenue Code 6-the section dealing with the inclusion of life insurance proceeds in the taxable estate of the insured.
This amendment is widely known for its removal of $40,000.00 specific
exemption which had been made available by revenue acts in effect from
1918 to 1942, to proceeds payable to beneficiaries other than the insured's
executor. But practically no discussion has been accorded the provisions of
the amendment which "freezes" life insurance proceeds in the taxable estate
of the insured. In effect, life insurance proceeds are no longer excludable in
their entirety from the insured's gross estate unless he released all incidents
of ownership prior to January 10, 1941, and has paid no premiums since.
If the incidents of ownership were released before that date but the insured
has paid premiums since, the proceeds are includible in his taxable estate
in .n amount which bears the same proportion to the total proceeds realized
tnat the amount of premiums paid by the insured since January 10, 1941,
bears to the total premiums paid. If the incidents of ownership are released
at a date subsequent to January 10, 1941, the proceeds are includible in the
insured's taxable estate in an amount which bears the same proportion to
the total proceeds realized that the amount of premiums paid by the insured
bears to the total premiums paid. If the incidents of ownership are not re-.
leased prior to the death of the insured, all of the proceeds realized are includible in his taxable estate regardless of who paid the premiums and in
what amount.
If properly advised, persons making application for new or additional
life insurance can avoid the full fury of this legislation under some circumstances by arranging for the payment of premiums by someone else and by
failing to reserve to themselves any of the various incidents of ownership.
While insurance may be written on the lives of those who are uninsurable
physically where its purchase is coupled with the purchase of an annuity
'Section 811. The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined
by including the value at the time of his death of all property, real or personal, tangible
or intangible, wherever situated, except real property situated outside of the U. S.

(g) "'Receivableby the Executor. To the extent of the amount receivable by
the executor or as insurance under policies upon the life of the decedent.
"Receivable by other beneficiaries. To the extent of the amount receivable
by all other beneficiaries as insurance under policies upon the life of the decedent
(A) purchased with premiums, or other consideration, paid directly or indirectly
by the decedent, in proportion that the amount so paid by the decedent bears to
the total premiums paid for the insurance, or (B) with respect to which the
decedent possessed at his death any of the incidents of ownership, exercisable
either alone or in conjunction with any other person. - * *"
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and the risk is thus neutralized, insurability generally is a prerequisite, and
those who are insurable are most frequently of an age at which it is unwise
to release incidents of ownership. Too much of life remains ahead for such
an insured to make it prudent for him to forego the right to change the beneficiary, to borrow against the policy, to pledge it as security, or to assign,
surrender or convert it. And arranging for another to pay premiums must
not be an easy thing for most insured persons to accomplish. It is no answer
to suggest that the insured might transfer funds to his wife or to some other
persons to be used by them for the payment of premiums, for the tax advanages are lost if the insured pays the premiums directly or indirectly. A House
committee report interpreting this expression considersothe case suggested and
states that under that situation it is the legislative intent that the payments
of premiums be considered to have been made by the insured, even though
they are not directly traceable to the precise funds transferred by the insured.
It is this prohibition against payment by the insured directly or indirectly
that has knocked out the insurance trust funded with assets provided by the
insured. It seems quite apparent that in the ordinary case it is not feasible
for most new or additional insurance to be set up in a form which will exclude
the proceeds from the insured's taxable estate.
What about insurance which has been in force for a number of years?
What rearrangements of these policies may be made looking toward the exclusion of the proceeds from the insured's taxable estate? Here the situation
is really very desperate. Hardly anyone has any business thinking about
surrendering the incidents of ownership over his life insurance until he can
predict with reasonable accuracy his own financial situation and that of his
named beneficiaries over the span of years which separates him from death.
Such a person is usually well advanced beyond middle age, and, in the ordinary case, he has always paid the premiums on his life insurance. Much of
his insurance may be "paid up." The amended provisions of the estate tax
law relating to life insurance offer no way in which he can exclude from
his taxable estate more than a negligible proportion of the proceeds of his
life insurance. He could release all incidents of ownership at his advanced
age with some degree of security. And if he could find someone who would
pay the few premiums which remain to be paid on those policies which have
not already become "paid up," some of the proceeds could be excluded from
his taxable estate. But the only amount of the proceeds which would not
be includible would be the amount which bears the same proportion to the
total proceeds realized as the amount of premiums paid by one other than
the insured bears to the total premiums paid-an insignificant amount at
best. If the insured's wife is a person of independent means, it might be wise
for him to convert his policies into policies of "paid up" insurance. The
proceeds payable on his death would be substantially reduced thereby and
the loss could be compensated by additional insurance on his life taken dut
by his wife and paid for from her own funds. But this would be the excep-
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tional case and does not present a serious qualification to the general statement that life insurance has been frozen in the insured's taxable estate. In
the ordinary case the only way that life insurance can be made the subject
of an inter vivos gift is by accepting its cash surrender value and making a
gift of the proceeds. Notwithstanding significant estate tax savings, surrender
normally involves a net loss so substantial that the plan is not entitled to
serious consideration.
The fact is that Congress has placed a restraint upon the disposition of
life insurance which is not applicable to property generally. In so doing it
has precluded the use of life insurance for purposes which appear to deserve
the support of intelligent legislation. The doctrine must be of most serious
concern to those whose principal or sole asset is life insurance, for they are
very likely to be in a position where they cannot seize the tax advantages to
be obtained from making gifts because they have no other property which
can be disposed of by gift. But to all who seek to cushion the impact of
federal taxation and to whom the disposition of large amounts of property
by gift appears to be the most practicable escape from confiscatory estate
taxes, the "freezing" of life insurance in the insured's estate must present
a fatal objection to its purchase in substantial amounts.

Ancient and Modern Leases
By EDWIN J. WITTELSHOFER
On the Denver bar, chairman of the Committees on Real Estate
Standards of the Denver and the Colorado Bar Associations, to
whom we are indebted for much of the progress which has been
made in the adoption of real estate title standards, and the
resulting uniformity in real estate practice in both Denver and
the entire state. An address before the Denver Bar Association,
March 1, 1948.

The method of leasing lands and tenements under written memoranda
is one of the earliest legal practices of history. Its precise origin is shrouded
in antiquity and it seems to have had early birth in all recognized legal
systems.
The form and method of leasing in this country is easily traced to England
where such practice was well implanted even before William, the Conqueror.
While in these early days leases were not regarded with too much sanctity
and were easily voided by the landlord, during the reign of Henry the VIII
acts were passed which permitted tenants to. maintain their rights to possession of leased property even against the landlord. These acts seem to be not
only the last but almost the only benefit established by statute law for aid
to the tenant.

